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Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of
the Internet: A Case Study of Cyber
Targeting
David A. Myers*
Throughout my life I have been fortunate to have long discussions
about politics with my father. (My mother calls them arguments.) Some
were pretty intense, but he taught by example that one can argue with
both passion and civility. His views are not driven by ideology, and I
would sometimes be quite surprised at the positions that he would take. I
asked him once how he would describe his philosophy, and, grinning, he
said, "I am a quiescent anarchist."
I have always thought that to be a rich and complex image. I
believe quiescent anarchy is a fitting description for the Internet.
Because of its nature, the Internet seems to defy any sort of conventional
approach to characterization or "imagining." The Internet also appears
to be quite resilient to government regulation.
But this innovative technology often leaves victims in its wake. An
example is the problem of Internet harassment, often used to target
fellow students or other young adults and children with e-mail messages
and even entire websites devoted to publicly humiliating the individual
with vulgar and often sexual content.' While some refer to this as
cyberbullying, I will refer to it as cyber targeting, because I think the
* Professor of Law at Valparaiso University. This article is based on a speech
delivered at the Second Annual First Amendment Forum at the University of Leeds,
England, on June 2, 2005, and also at a discussion forum sponsored by the Mainz Media
Institute at Johannes Gutenberg University on June 9, 2005 at Mainz, Germany.
Copyright © David A. Myers, 2005. All rights reserved. I would like to thank the
participants of the two colloquia, along with Professors Ivan Bodensteiner, Rosalie
Levinson and David Vandercoy for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Denise
Koebcke for guiding me in the direction of the subject matter of this article. Finally, I
thank Don Shuler for assistance in research. All errors remain my own.
1. See Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the
Conflict Between Schools and the FirstAmendment, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 1213 (2003). See
also Marilyn A. Campbell, Cyberbullying: An Old Problem in a New Guise?, 15(1)
AUSTRALIA JOURNAL OF GUIDANCE AND COUNSELING 68 (2005) (discussing the global

problem of cyberbullying).
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term both reflects more accurately what is going on and indicates that it
can include many potential legal causes of action under defamation and
privacy laws, among others. What I would like to do is bring attention to
the problem, and call upon those who work in academia and in the
practice of law to focus on possible solutions to this problem.
Because my goal is to raise consciousness of a real problem that
seems to have no current solution in American law, this article will be
exploratory in nature. Nevertheless, as a first proposition I would simply
say that the law must provide some kind of remedy for this increasingly
common and increasingly abusive activity.2 The second proposition that
I would make is that policymakers should be very cautious about
regulations. In the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 3 for example,
Congress granted rather broad immunity to Internet service providers
(ISPs) that, in some cases, leaves no one legally accountable for injuries
caused by anonymous postings on the Internet. What I am proposing is
that Congress be judicious in its efforts to regulate the Internet, and leave
room for the common law, including the constitutional decisions
concerning freedom of speech, to work through some of the questions
brought about by this new and still developing technology.
I.

A Case Study of Cyber Targeting

In an in-depth broadcast on bullying, the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC), told the story of a young man named David Knight
who had been bullied at school for years.4 Someone set up a website
about him entitled: "Welcome to the page that makes fun of Dave
Knight. ' '5 Whoever created the website asked others to join in, and they
did. David said he was accused of being a pedophile and of using the
date rape drug on little boys. Additionally, he received e-mails that were
vulgar and sexually explicit. It was clear that David was being targeted.6
David's mother, Nancy, reported that this Internet targeting seemed
to have an effect that was different from the verbal attacks and bruises he
received at school. She said he began to withdraw, and to isolate himself
from everyone. David's parents asked the police to investigate, find out
2. See Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in the Schools: The Disconnect Between
Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (discussing the gap between empirical research on the harms
caused by bullying and the law's response to such dangers).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004).
4. The information and quotes in the next few paragraphs are taken from the CBC
News website.
CBC News Online, "Cyber-Bullying," http:/Avww.cbc.ca/news/
background/bullying/cyberbullying.html (last visited Sep. 24, 2005).
5. Id.
6. See BARBARA COLOROSO, THE BULLY, THE BULLIED, AND THE BYSTANDER (2003)
(describing the process and the impact of this targeting phenomenon).
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who was behind the Internet site, and have it removed from the web. A
police officer, who declined to comment on David's case, said that
Internet bullying is difficult to investigate unless it crosses the line into
death threats or other criminal offenses.7
The parents then contacted Yahoo!, the ISP for the website. Nancy
Knight said succinctly, "Nothing happened." 8 Yahoo! was apparently
following industry practice. Jay Thompson, then President of the
Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP), 9 stated during a
broadcast:
ISP's are not censors; they are not morality police, and we don't
think Canadians want their ISP to be making determinations as to
what is appropriate content for them or their families to view. That is
homes based on their own value
a decision to make in their own
10
systems and their own interests.

This sentiment was reinforced by Jeffrey Shallit, a spokesperson for
a group called Electronic Frontier. He said:
I think that free speech is an important value in Canada and I think
we should start at an early age to tell kids that this is an important
value. When a person.., in a position of authority says "look, you
say this and I don't like it and therefore I'm going to censor it" we
are sending students really the wrong message. We are saying that
free speech isn't a value that we support.

It sounds trite but people say "sticks and stones can break my bones,
but names will never hurt me," and I think that part of the response
no one is coming
should be to tell people, look, this is name calling,
12
after you with brass knuckles or a baseball bat.

Later in the broadcast, Mr. Shallit said, "Freedom of speech protects the
thought we hate just as much as the thought we like. It's not a pleasant
don't
lesson to learn all the time, but we know in societies where they
13
worse."
much
are
consequences
the
that
speech
of
allow freedom
7. CBC News Online, supra note 4.
8.

Id.

9. Id. According to its website, http://www.caip.ca (last visited Sept. 24, 2005),
one of the main purposes of CAIP is to "provide effective industry advocacy respecting
public policy and regulatory matters (e.g., access, copyright, privacy and security issues,
e-commerce guidelines) affecting Canada's ISP industry." Id.
10. CBC News Online, supra note 4.
11.

Id.

12.
13.

Id.
Id.
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David's response to this was that it is not easy for teenagers these
days to escape the world of the Internet. "I mean, sure you could just
hide from everything, you could shut the door to your room and sit in ' a4
chair for the rest of your life, but that wouldn't work out too well."'
David also pointed out that electronic bullying is different from face-toface controversies:
Rather than just some people, say thirty in a cafeteria, hearing them
all yell insults at you, it's up there for 6 billion people to see.
Anyone with a computer can see it. And you can't get away from it.
It doesn't go away when15 you come home from school. It made me
feel even more trapped.
David decided to leave school, and completed his senior year at
home. Meanwhile, the Knight family eventually did get Yahoo! to take
down the website about David. It took several months, however, and the
family believes that the threat of legal action had
an important impact on
16
website.
the
remove
to
decision
the company's
II.

The Legislative Response from an American Perspective

In the next section, I will analyze whether David would have a
cause of action under the common law of defamation if a similar event
occurred in the United States. First, I need to address an anomaly in
American law that would affect the litigation of a young man like David
if he were to bring the cause of action in the United States. Remember
that the individuals posting the information on David's website were
anonymous. That prompted David's family to put pressure on the ISP,
Yahoo!, in order to get the company to take down the website.
That strategy could be thwarted by § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) of 1996.17 Section 230 provides in part:
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2)

Civil Liability.

No provider or user of an interactive

14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
CBC News Online, supra note 4.

17.

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004).
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computer service shall be held liable on account of-(A) any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or
make available to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).

(e) Effect on other laws
(3) State Law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent
with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.18
This controversial provision has resulted in rather broad immunity for
ISPs, and may, in some cases, leave no one legally accountable for
injuries caused by anonymous postings on the Internet.
A case in point is Zeran v. America Online, Inc.19 After the
Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, someone anonymously posted on
America Online's (AOL) message boards a series of messages claiming
to be an advertisement for "naughty Oklahoma t-shirts."2 ° The t-shirts
were both vulgar and insensitive, but the person who posted the
messages identified himself as "Ken Z" and gave Zeran's phone number
as the one to call in order to purchase the t-shirts. Zeran received
abusive telephone calls and even death threats from people as a result of
this posting on AOL. Zeran notified AOL, which in turn terminated the
contract from which the posting had originated. The person responsible
for the original postings set up new accounts with false names and credit
cards, and the same thing happened repeatedly. Zeran complained and
AOL discontinued the listings, but new postings continued to crop up.
Clearly, Zeran had been targeted by this anonymous culprit, and he
eventually decided to sue AOL, claiming it had acted negligently.2 1 The

18. Id.
19. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
20. The slogans for the t-shirts included the following: "Visit Oklahoma.... It's A
Blast!!!," and "Finally A Day Care Center That Keeps The Kids Quiet-Oklahoma
1995." Zeran v. America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 nn.3 & 5 (E.D. Va. 1997).
21. Id.at1128.
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court concluded that § 230 of the CDA provided absolute immunity to
AOL even if the ISP had been aware that the material was defamatory. 12
The statute, as applied by Zeran and other cases, 23 presents an
interesting paradox in the American law of defamation. Walter Pincus, a
highly regarded reporter at the Washington Post, explained the paradox
this way:
I work under contract for the Washington Post Newspaper. If the
Post published an article of mine defaming a private individual, the
paper would be liable. However, if washingtonpost.com, the Post's
on-line Internet site, were to carry the same article, it would not be
similarly liable. Why? Because Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 bars liability for interactive computer service
providers exercising a publisher's traditional editorial functions, such
as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.
The act immunizes Internet providers from precisely the sort of
liability on which plaintiffs rely to hold other publishers
accountable. 24
Pincus reported that the CDA "embodied a marriage of two distinct
lobbying efforts: one designed to combat Internet pornography and the
other to remedy the Prodigy decision as interpreted by the on-line
industry."
As to the latter reference, Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy
Services Co. 26 started out humbly enough as a New York Trial Court
opinion, which held the online service provider liable for defamatory
statements on its bulletin board.27 Prodigy had decided to regulate the
content of its bulletin boards (in part so that it could market itself as a
"family oriented" computer service). This exercise of editorial control
opened Prodigy up to greater liability than computer networks that make
no such choice because it raised its status to a "publisher" of content
rather than just a "distributor., 28 Online service providers saw this ruling
22.

Id. at 1136-37.

23.

See, e.g., Jane Doe v. America Online, 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001). The

majority follows Zeran, but the impressive dissent by Justice Lewis provides an
alternative "functional analysis" of § 230 that differentiates -between an ISP acting as a
common carrier and one acting as a re-publisher. Id. at 1027 n.22 (citing Joshua M.
Mazur, A Most Uncommon Carrier: Online Service Provider Immunity Against
Defamation Claims in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 217, 227 (2000)). More
specifically, when an ISP knowingly distributes defamatory messages, it should not be
afforded immunity under § 230. Id. (citing Sheri Hunter, Defamation and Privacy Laws
Face the Internet, 17 CoMM. LAWYER (Fall 1999), at 16, 17).
24. Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox:Libel, Slander and the FirstAmendment in
Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279, 279 (1999).
25. Id. at 282.
26. 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).

27. Id. at *13-14.
28. /d. at*10-11.
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as presenting a Hobson's choice: if ISPs attempt to keep defamatory or
offensive material from being posted, these efforts paradoxically set the
service providers up for publisher liability.
Congress "resolved" the dilemma by enacting § 230.
The
conference committee report states:
This section provides "Good Samaritan" protections from civil
liability for providers or users of an interactive computer service for
actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable
online material. One of the specific purposes of this section is to
overrule Stratton-Oakmontv. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers
of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions
create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of
empowering parents to determine the content of communications
.
their children receive through interactive computer services. 29

The title of § 230 correspondingly reads: "Protection for 'Good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material., 30 in this way,
the CDA provided a "safe harbor" for pro-active online service providers
and simultaneously furthered the statute's goal of preserving "the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by federal or state
31
regulation."
Lawyers for Prodigy predicted that this language would result in
almost complete immunity to online service providers,32 and Zeran
proved them right. So, as long as Zeran remains the leading case
interpreting § 230, the CDA seems to provide a substantial barrier to
people like David and his family that rightly want ISPs to help guard
against cyber targeting.3 3 It is true that they might not be able to hold a
34
service provider liable even without the immunity granted by § 230.
But with the immunity, going after the ISP in cases like this would seem

29. H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2004).
32. Pincus, supra note 24, at 283.
33. For an empirical study of the kinds of difficulties that plaintiffs like David are
confronted with in American law, see Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig,
Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REv. 335, 344-62 (2005). The authors conclude
that "new torts are evolving to protect the rights of ISPs, websites, search engines, and
other Internet corporate entities, while these same stakeholders are immunized from tort
actions brought by consumers and other computer users." Id. at 344-45. The authors
propose amending § 230 so that an ISP would not be liable for third party defamation
until it received actual notice of objectionable content and failed to take prompt remedial
action to avoid further losses. Id. at 343.
34. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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to be an unsuccessful strategy.
III.

The Approach under the Common Law

How would David's case proceed in an American jurisdiction,
without the shackles or limitations placed by federal legislation? In
perhaps an instance of remarkable irony, David might find solace in a
case involving defamation in fiction litigated in the Supreme Court of
35
Illinois. The case is Bryson v. News America Publ'ns,Inc.
In a fictional short story entitled "Bryson," written by the defendant
Lucy Logsdon, and published by News America in the March 1991 issue
of Seventeen magazine, the author recounts in first person narrative a
conflict between the narrator and her high school classmate. According
to the narrator, Bryson was a kid who lives "on the other side of town"
and was "after her." The narrator discusses an incident that occurred two
months earlier:
About two months ago Bryson was at a bonfire with these two guys
that nobody knew. One had a tattoo, and they were all drinking.
Lots. Who knows what guys like that made Bryson do. The next day
she came in to school with a black eye. Beth Harper looked at her
too long, and Bryson slammed her up against a glass door and
cracked her one clean in the mouth.
Later that afternoon, as Bryson shouted down the hallways like
always, I remembered what a slut she was and forgot about the
sorryness I'd been holding on to for a period.3 6
These and other events led up to an after school fight between Bryson
and the narrator.
The irony comes in the fact that Kimberly Bryson brought the
lawsuit against the magazine and the writer for defamation of character.
She had to prove, first, that this was a defamatory publication "of and
concerning" the plaintiff. Bryson said she was identifiable through the
use of her name in the title of the short story, by similarities between her
and the character, and by the fact that a footnote at the end of the story
37
identifies the author, Lucy Logsdon, as a "native of southern Illinois.
Kimberly Bryson grew up in the same hometown as Lucy Logsdon.
Bryson claimed that the material was defamatory, indeed
defamatory per se, because the defendants, by using the word "slut,"
implied that she was unchaste. The complaint thus alleged, and the court

35.

627 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996).

36.
37.

Id. at 1213.
Id.
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ultimately agreed, that the defendants published words that falsely
accused the plaintiff of fornication. 38 This amounts to a defamation per
se charge, if it can be proven.
The defendants argued that the defamatory statement could not
reasonably be interpreted as conveying actual facts about the plaintiff
because the story was clearly labeled "fiction." Therefore, the portions
of the story, in context, could not be reasonably understood as describing
actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which she
participated. 39 The court responded:
Here, although the story Bryson is labeled as fiction, the story itself is
not so fanciful or ridiculous that no reasonable person would interpret
it as describing actual persons or events. ... On the contrary, the
story here portrays realistic characters responding in a realistic
manner to realistic events. A reasonable reader could logically
conclude that the author of the story had drawn upon her own
experiences as a teenager when writing the story. Under the
circumstances, we must reject the defendant's claim that the story
cannot reasonably be interpreted
as stating actual facts simply
40
because it is labeled fiction.
The court refused to grant the defendants' motions to dismiss the action.
The case presents compelling issues regarding the law of
defamation concerning fictional works:
what is a defamatory
publication; when is a publication labeled fiction sufficiently directed
towards one individual that it can be said to be "of and concerning" that
plaintiff, are short stories like this one meant to be interpreted literally or
simply as constructs of an author's mind even if based on personal
experiences; and what role should the First Amendment play in any or all
of these questions? 41 Justice Ann McMorrow, in dissent, challenged the
majority on each of these individual questions, and provided an analysis
that would protect the writer and the publisher.42 The subject matter of
the case is arguably an issue of public import: the story is about bullying
in high school, a subject that I have already identified as both important
and under-recognized, and this fictional account may in fact provide a
window into the reality of verbal, physical, and relational aggression in
high schools in the way that no true account of the subject ever could.

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1221.

41. For an overview of these issues in defamation cases involving fiction, including
the Bryson case, see NIMMER, MARCUS, NIMMER & MYERS, COPYRIGHT AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION
AND PRIVACY (Illustrated), Ch. 13 (7th ed. 2006).

42.

Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1225-29.
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But, I am concerned about David, and his ability to empower
himself to guard against the kind of relentless and humiliating attacks
brought on by a website that was anonymously created for the very
purpose of humiliating him. In this regard, I think Bryson provides at
least the following insight into the context of this case study: falsely
accusing David of being a pedophile or of using the date rape drug could
constitute per se defamation.4 3 The website is obviously "of and
concerning" David, because it includes both his picture and his full
name. David is a private person and the defendants would likely be
considered private individuals as well. In the United States, these facts
might actually invoke common law libel to decide the matter,44
notwithstanding the changes made to the tort by way of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan45 and its progeny.
But if David cannot find recourse against these defendants, indeed,
if he cannot even find out who they are, can he sue the ISP? It may be an
understatement to say that Congress, through § 230 of the CDA, has
made that an uphill battle for someone like David to win. Three recent
opinions, however, may offer hope to individuals who find themselves
targeted on the Internet.
IV. Are the Winds of Change Stirring for § 230 Immunity?
Two recent developments, one in federal court and the other in two
cases now pending before the California Supreme Court, may
foreshadow the day when litigants can penetrate the shield of Internet
immunity provided by § 230 of the CDA. The first is a decision by
Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In John Doe
v. GTE Corp.,46 the plaintiffs were varsity athletes from several
universities. These individuals found themselves on tapes from secret
video cameras in the locker rooms, bathrooms and showers of several
sports teams. These tapes with titles such as "Voyeur Time" and
"Between the Lockers" showed the players in various states of undress.
The videotapes were sold through websites that included still images of
the plaintiffs taken from the videotapes.
The lawsuit named as
defendants the persons that offered the tapes for sale, the college officials
who had failed to detect and remove the cameras, and three corporations
that provided Internet access and web posting services to the sellers of
43. See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §4:9 (2004) ("Some courts,
however, have held abusive speech actionable if the context in which it is used allows it
to be interpreted to have a defamatory meaning.") (citing Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1214).
The context is difficult to assess in this case study without seeing the entire website.
44. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
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the tapes. The sellers either defaulted or were dismissed when they
could not be located for service of process. The college officials
prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity.
Two ISPs, GTE
Corporation and Genuity Incorporated, were the only defendants left
standing.47
The district court held that the ISPs were immune from liability
under § 230 of the CDA, relying on the reasoning of the Zeran decision
and other similar federal court opinions.48
But Judge Easterbrook
questioned the reasoning of those courts in a passage that goes directly to
the heart of the issue concerning § 230 immunity:
If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs
indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit:
whether they do (sub-section (c)(2)) or do not (sub-section (c)(1))
take precautions, there is no liability under state or federal law. As
precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost
revenue from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the
do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet
§ 230(c)-which is, recall, part of the "Communications Decency
Act"-bears the title "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and
screening of offensive material," hardly an apt description if its
principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution
of indecent and offensive materials via their services. Why should a
law designed to eliminate ISPs' liability to the creators of offensive
material end up 49defeating claims by the victims of tortious or
criminal conduct?
Judge Easterbrook then suggested that one should read § 230(c)(1) as a
definitional clause rather than as providing immunity from liability,
thereby harmonizing the text of the statute with the title of the statute.
Under this reading of the statute, an ISP would remain a "provider or
user" and be eligible for immunity under § 230(c)(2) as long as the
information comes from someone else. It would, however, become a
"publisher or speaker" and lose the benefit of § 230 immunity if it
created the objectionable information. Easterbrook concluded:
the difference between this reading and the district court's is that
§ 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs to filter offensive content, and thus
§ 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws or common-law doctrines
that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third parties,
47. Id. at 656. The third corporation, PSInet, had been liquidated in bankruptcy. Id.
48. See John Does v. Franko Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645 (2000). In
addition to Zeran, the lower court cited Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. America
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) and Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998).
49. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
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such as the spied-on plaintiffs, for such laws
would not be
50
"inconsistent with" this understanding § 230(c)(1).

As Professor Kang observes, this dicta turns § 230(c)(1) into a
definitional provision so that the immunity is provided only in
§ 230(c)(2) when a provider or user in good faith tries to filter away
indecent materials.
Under this analysis, then, some "state laws or common law
doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third
parties" 52 might remain in play despite the judicial gloss that other courts
have given to § 230. Judge Easterbrook is not clear as to what laws
might qualify, although he hints that defamation might not be one of
them. 53 The plaintiffs in the GTE litigation failed to cite any case in any
jurisdiction holding that an ISP must take reasonable care to prevent
injury to third parties, moving Judge Easterbrook to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the case. 54 But this decision leaves open the
possibility that a court in future litigation may find just such a duty of
55
care.
50.

Id.

51.

JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 394

(2d ed. 2005).
52. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.
53. Id. As an alternative reading of § 230(c)(1), Judge Easterbrook suggests that the
statute may foreclose any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a "publisher" while
permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries. Id. He
specifically notes that defamation law would be a good example of such liability under
this alternative reading of the statute. Id.
54. Id. at 661.
55. Id. at 660-61. Judge Easterbrook in dicta did suggest the possibility that because
of their contracts with the sellers of the secret tapes, the ISP may have assumed a duty to
protect third parties like the plaintiffs. Id. at 661. The parties did not raise this issue on
appeal, so again this theory was unavailing. (The lower court had held against the
plaintiffs on the third party beneficiary claim, and counsel apparently decided against
raising this issue on appeal. See John Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8645 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000).)
One court that has reached that issue on the merits is Morrison v. America Online,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001). Dr. Morrison lived and practiced medicine in
Starke County, Indiana. Id. at 931. Morrison alleged that in July of 2000, a subscriber to
AOL's Internet service, SurfCity45, sent false and defamatory statements about her by email to a practitioner in Webster, Texas. Id. Morrison also alleged that SurfCity45
contacted another subscriber to AOL and made threats to Dr. Morrison's license to
practice and asked the second subscriber to make similar threats to her. Id. After more
defamatory e-mails were sent, Dr. Morrison notified AOL about the problems concerning
SurfCity45, but the company failed to take any action. Id.
Under AOL's membership agreement (Membership Agreement), AOL expressly
states that it is not responsible for the contents supplied by the customers, and that it is
the customer's duty to adhere to the community guidelines adopted by AOL. Id. at 93132. AOL has the sole discretion to enforce the community guidelines, however, and may
terminate the customer's account for failure to adhere to those guidelines. Id. at 932.
Morrison argued that these terms were intended to benefit her, that the contract imposes a

2006]

DEFAMATION AND THE QUIESCENT ANARCHY OF THE INTERNET

679

Two other important decisions providing some hope for the victims
of cyber targeting are now before the California Supreme Court. In
Grace v. eBay, Inc., Roger Grace purchased several individual items on
the auction site eBay, then posted negative comments on the seller
relating to some of the transactions.56
The seller responded by
commenting on Grace with the following statement, "Complaint:
SHOULD BE BANNED FROM EBAY!!!!! DISHONEST ALL THE
WAY!!!!,, 57 Grace notified eBay that the seller's comments were
defamatory, but eBay declined to remove them.58 Grace sued both the
seller and eBay, alleging counts against eBay for libel and violation of
the Unfair Competition Law, and seeking specific performance of eBay's
user agreement with the seller. 59 Grace withdrew the last count after
eBay removed the comments from its website.6 °
The Grace court reviewed defendant's assertion of § 230 immunity
by construing the statute within the context of the common law
distinction between publisher liability and distributor liability in
defamation cases. 61 At common law, a publisher could be held liable for
defamation, but a distributor (such as a book store) could not be unless it
knew or had reason to know of the defamatory material. 62 Because the
statute does not say anything about distributor liability, the California
Appellate Court concluded that eBay could be held liable once it knew
the information was defamatory and refused to do anything about it. 63 In
this case, however, Grace had signed a release of liability as part of the
user agreement with eBay, 64
and the court concluded that this waiver
liability.
from
eBay
protected
The California decision in Grace represents a direct challenge to the
duty on the customers to exercise reasonable care with regard to third parties, and that the
performance of the terms of the contract rendered to her a direct benefit clearly intended
by the parties to the contract. Id. at 934. Without much analysis, the court concluded
that her third party beneficiary claim failed by pointing to Section 8 of the Membership
Agreement which states, "You agree that this Member Agreement is not intended to
confer and does not confer any rights or remedies upon any person other than the parties
to this Agreement." Id. at 934; accord Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d
Cir. 2003) (concluding that "the Member Agreement between the parties tracks the
provisions of section 230 and provides that AOL 'does not assume any responsibility' for
content provided by third parties.").
56. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 196 (Cal Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal.
2004), review dismissed and remanded, 101 P.3d 509 (Cal. 2004).

57.

Id.

58.
59.

Id.
Id.

60. Id. at 196.
61. Id. at 198-99.
62. See Grace, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 198-99.
63. Id. at 195.
64.

Id.
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Fourth Circuit's interpretation in Zeran concerning the broad scope of
the immunity that Congress intended to provide to ISPs in § 230 of the
CDA. The seemingly invincible force of Zeran as precedent boils down,
surprisingly, to just one sentence: the notice-based distributor theory of
liability "is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and is
therefore also foreclosed by § 230.,,65 The problem is that Congress did
not say that. The Zeran court came to its conclusion by relying on its
major premise that Congress intended above all other considerations to
insulate Internet corporations from lawsuits in order to encourage the
growth of the industry.66 That suggests that Congress simply turned a
blind eye toward reputation injuring and privacy invading activities on
the Internet. As Judge Easterbrook pointed out, this seems odd coming
from a "Communications Decency Act" with a provision entitled
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material. 67 The Zeran court's interpretation turns protection of the
"Good Samaritan" into protection of the good, 68 the bad 69 and the
65. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
66. The Zeran court asserted:
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress
recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the
new and burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on
service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress,
simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230
was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication
and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum.
Id. at 331. By at least one crude measurement, Congress has succeeded in this goal, if in
fact Zeran has correctly interpreted Congressional intent: Terry S. Semel, the CEO of
Yahoo!, was the highest paid executive in the nation, earning 230.6 million dollars in
2004. See Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/static/pvp2005/LIRXC25.html (last visited
November 9, 2005).
67. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655,660 (7th Cir. 2003).
68. Of all of the cases canvassed in this article, the only ISP, ironically, that
attempted to take a pro-active, family oriented approach to editing the content of its
bulletin boards was Prodigy Services in the Stratton Oakmont litigation. See supra notes
6-28 and accompanying text. It was precisely this kind of consumer oriented activity on
the part of ISPs that Congress intended to protect with § 230, and no doubt § 230 would
provide immunity for this kind of content supervision.
From the numerous cases decided after Zeran, it is difficult to discern just what
policy ISPs now follow. According to a recent cover story in Forbes Magazine, the
policy at one company, Google, is as follows:
Google and other carriers shut down providers of child porn, spain and viruses,
and they help police track down offenders. So why don't they delete material
that defames individuals? Why don't they help victims identify their attackers?
Because they are protected by the Communications Decent Act of 1996, which
frees a neutral carrier of Internet content from any liability for anything said on
line.
...

Yet Google edits and censors log content all the time-to protect its own
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pathetic.70
Perhaps the most formidable challenge to the primacy of the Zeran
precedent is the reasoning of another California Appellate Court

decision, Barrett v. Rosenthal.7 1 Steven Barrett and Terry Polevoy are
physicians engaged in "alternative" health care practices. 72 Ilena
Rosenthal also is involved in the field and participates actively in two
73
Usenet "news groups," which focus on "alternative medicine.
Rosenthal distributed on the newsgroups an e-mail message she received
from another defendant, Timothy Bolen. 4 The message accused Dr.
Polevoy of stalking women, in particular, Christine McPhee, a Canadian
radio personality whose program in support of "alternative medicine"
Polevoy disliked. 75 Ms. McPhee allegedly sought police protection, and
"the police kept two uniformed officers on site for some time."7 6 Other
allegedly defamatory statements were made about Dr. Barrett, but the
Court eventually dismissed these counts.7 7

Both Barrett and Polevoy

interests. The company, whose portentous corporate ethos includes the mantra
"Don't be evil," snuffs out blogs that engage in "phishing" (tricking people into
revealing confidential information) and "spam blogs" that skew Google's
search results. Bloggers who sign up for its ad program (Google passes along
79% of sales, on average) must follow firm Google guidelines that limit
references to drugs, alcohol, tobacco, gambling and even "excessive profanity."
Daniel Lyons, Attack of the Blogs, FORBES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 128, 136, 138.
69. I would put Zeran in this category. To be sure, the Zeran court recognized that
the plaintiff in that case could always go after the original culprit to pursue the
defamation claim. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. But the pervasive use of anonymous postings,
and the ISPs' decisions to protect such anonymity, assure that this suggestion will most
often simply evaporate into cyber space. The virtues of anonymity must somehow be
balanced against the interests of those who are victimized by tortious communications on
the Internet. See SMOLLA, supra note 43, § 4: 86.50; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing
John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855 (2000).
70. I would put in this category Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
2001). In that case the mother of an eleven-year-old sought to hold AOL liable for
permitting a man named Richard Lee Russell to market child pornography. Id. at 1011.
Russell had lured her son and two other minor males to engage in sexual activity,
photographed and videotaped these acts, and utilized AOL's "chat rooms" to market the
images. Id. Following the analysis in Zeran, the Florida court dismissed all actions
against AOL. Id. at 1018. It is hard to imagine that the sponsors of § 230 envisioned in
cases like this that courts would encourage ISPs to take what Judge Easterbrook calls the
"do nothing" approach. See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.
71. 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), reh'g granted sub nom. Barrett v.
Clark, No. A096451, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1932 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), motion to strike
rev 'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded,Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004).
72. Id. at419.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 420.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Barrett, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 420.
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informed Rosenthal that the statements were false and defamatory and
threatened to sue if they were not withdrawn.78 Rosenthal refused to
withdraw the message.79
Interestingly, this case does not include an ISP as a defendant. The
trial court, however, found Rosenthal to be immune from liability for the
re-posting of Bolen's statements under § 230, viewing the statute as
providing immunity even if the re-published charge that Polevoy had
engaged in criminal conduct was false and defamatory. 80 Because the
trial court relied on Zeran for this conclusion, the stage was properly set
for a re-examination of the Zeran precedent.
The California Appellate Court in Barrett examined the issues in
this case as a common law court construing a federal statute. It noted
first that, under the common law, those who publicize another's libel
may be treated in one of three ways: 1) as a primary publisher (such as
of a book); 2) as a distributor (such as a book store); or 3) as conduits
(such as a telephone company). 81 Primary publishers are generally held
to a strict standard of liability comparable to that of authors. 82 Conduits,
however, lack the ability to screen and control defamatory speech and are
83
therefore the least culpable and ordinarily immune from liability.
Distributors are subject to an intermediate standard of responsibility and
may only be held liable as publishers if they know or have reason to
84
know of the defamatory nature of the matter they disseminate.
The court then examined § 230 within this context. It found no
clear or explicit intent by Congress "to abrogate the common law
principle that one who republishes defamatory matter originated by a
third person is subject to liability if he or she knows or has reason to
know of its defamatory character.,85 The court observed:
The statement that they "shall not incur liability as publishers or
speakers of information provided by other content providers" (§ 230,
subd. (c)(1), italics added) does not expressly or even by necessary
implication foreclose the possibility of holding them liable as
distributors. "Indeed one could argue from the enumeration of
publisher 86and speaker in § 230(c)(1) that distributor was deliberately
omitted."

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 420-21.
ld. at 421.
Id. at425.
Barrett, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426-27 (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) TORTS § 581(1) (1977)).

Id. at 431 (quoting David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section
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Even assuming arguendothat the analysis in Zeran is a plausible one, the
California court cites with approval the following canon of statutory
interpretation: "Where there is a limitation by statute which is capable of
more than one construction the statute87must be given that construction
which is consistent with common law.",
The Barrett court also distills from a long list of critical
commentary concerning the Zeran approach several important points
about § 230. For example, all agree that Congress intended to create
incentives for ISPs to proactively screen and edit the content of
information placed on the Internet. But the court notes, as one
commentator observed,
Common sense dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money
monitoring content over the Internet when it will suffer no
repercussions from failing to do so. Thus, immunizing ISPs from
distributor liability would frustrate Congress's objectives under the
CDA much
more than would subjecting ISP's to distributor
88
liability.
Moreover, even if the distributor is held liable, the plaintiff must still
show all of the common law elements of the tort (such as defamation),
including constitutional limitations that may be imposed on those causes
of action. 89 Finally, the court notes, the overarching theme of Zeran's
critics is that the court's analysis is unbalanced: "In short, as to
defamation, our jurisprudence establishes a nuanced legal regime: while
'libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations,'
neither does the constitutional freedom provide an unfettered right to
libel." 90 The California court concludes by quoting the United States
230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet,

61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 162 (1997).
87.

Id. at 432 (quoting NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 50.01, at 137-39 (6th ed. 2000)).
88. Barrett, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 436 (quoting Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet
Service Providersfrom Third-PartyInternetDefamation Claims: How FarShould Courts
Go?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 647, 684 (2002)).

89. Id. at 437-48.
First of all, it must be shown that an alleged defamation is not an opinion or
satire or mere hyperbole but an assertion of actual fact, and even then
knowledge and the requisite degree of fault must be shown. Furthermore, if
defamation relates to a public figure or a matter of public concern, as will often
be the case, the intermediary would also have to be shown to have acted with
actual malice, which is usually extremely difficult. Even if the defamation
relates to a private figure it ordinarily would not be actionable without proof of
special damage ([Cal.] Civ. Code, § 45a) and the defendant might have the

advantage of one or more of the many common law privileges for types of
speech deemed worthy of extra protection.
Id. (citations omitted).
90.

Id. at 440 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
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Supreme Court:
[A]bsolute protection for the communications media requires a total
sacrifice of the competing value[s] served by the law of defamation.
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by
defamatory falsehood. We would not likely require the State to
abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the
individual's right to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the
protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the
right is entitled to any 9less recognition by this Court as a basic of our
constitutional system.' '
The court then says flatly, "Zeran's analysis flies in the face of this
92
admonition.
The California Supreme Court has granted review of the Barrett
case. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated:
In addition to the issues set forth in the petition for review, the Court
requests the parties to include briefing on the following questions:
(1) What is the meaning of the term "user" under section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. [§] 230)? (2) For purposes
of the issue presented by this case, 93does it matter whether a user
engaged in active or passive conduct?
The case is expected to be decided in early 2006.
Although the federal court in GTE and the California courts in
Grace and Barrett give some hope to victims of cyber targeting, these
cases represent more promise than reality. Indeed, the courts in two of
the cases held against the plaintiffs, either because of careful drafting on
the part of the ISPs or because of arguments that were not made to the
appellate court. These decisions nevertheless hold out the promise to
"loosen the binding force of precedent" 94 of cases like Zeran and others

91. Id. at 431 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
92. Id. at 431.
93. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 87 P.3d 797, 797 (Cal. 2004).
94. The phrase is Allan C. Hutchinson's. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND
THE COMMON LAW

7 (2005).

In an important sense, the common law is to be found in the unfolding struggle
between the openings of decisional freedom and the closings of precedential
constraint. Consequently, in order to ensure that the common law does not
grind to a halt and begin to slide into irrelevance and injustice under the weight
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to allow the common law to work toward a better balance of interests in
these types of cases.
V.

Conclusions

The problems of bullying in high schools and cyber targeting on the
Internet are problems that must be addressed in a variety of ways and by
a number of people. So, I would ask those of you in Great Britain,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, whose common law traditions are
similar to ours and who have often allowed for the interest in protecting
reputation to be taken very seriously, to provide us with examples as to
how this problem might be confronted.95 Likewise, I would be interested
of its own backward-looking mind-set, the courts have developed a whole
series of techniques that allow them to avoid or loosen the binding force of
precedent. In a manner of speaking, institutional necessity has been the parent
of judicial invention.
Id.
95. The leading decision in England, Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., (1999) [2001]
Q.B. 201, is certainly a meaningful development in the area of cyber targeting. Dr.
Godfrey, a lecturer in physics, mathematics and computer science, sued Demon Internet,
an ISP, for defamation based on a message that an unknown person posted on
soc.culture.thai. Id. at 204-05. The court did not detail what was on this message, but
concluded that it was "squalid, obscene, and defamatory." Id. at 205. Godfrey requested
from Demon that the message be removed. Id. The message was removed, but not until
after ten days had elapsed. Id. Godfrey sued the ISP. Id. at 201.
Again, we have a common law court construing a national statute. Section 1 of the
Defamation Act of 1996 provides in part:
(1) In defamation proceedings the person has a defence if he shows that[:]
(a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained
of,
(b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and
(c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused
or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.
Defamation Act of 1996, 31, § 1 (Eng.). The court concluded that Demon was not a
publisher of the statement under § 1(1)(a). Id. at 206. However, because Godfrey
informed Demon of the posting of the defamatory message but the ISP did not remove it,
this indicated that the ISP failed to take reasonable care, and Demon had reason to
believe that it contributed to the publication of the defamatory statement. Id. at 206, 212.
The defendant therefore failed to prove all three elements of the defense set out in § 1(1)
of the statute. See id. at 205. The court reviewed both English common law and the
legislative history of the statute, and determined that the statute was not meant to
completely abrogate that law and provide absolute immunity. See id. at 212. The
defendant settled the case for approximately $25,000 in damages plus plaintiff's costs
(reportedly as high as several hundred thousand dollars). Michael L. Rustad & Thomas
H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for Europe and America, 5 J.HIGH. TECH. L.J.
13, 48 (2005).
Significantly, this development in English law presents an interesting experiment on
one of the important issues underlying the difference between the Zeran decision and the
Barrett case. The Zeran court speculated that imposing notice-based liability would in
effect cripple the Internet industry because of the large number of messages that might be
put into question by potential litigants. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333
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in hearing how some of the legal systems of continental Europe, like
Germany, which focus on an insult to honor as an actionable wrong,
would handle the situation presented here. Similarly, for all of those
writers who believe that Internet technology can take care of itself, and
provide solutions to problems without the need for government
intervention or judicial relief, tell us what those solutions are.
Finally, American policymakers must confront the paradoxes of
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The brutal irony is that a
statute created by Congress to empower families with children finding
themselves in a situation similar to David's has had exactly the opposite
effect. That dilemma must be addressed first so that the quiescent
pragmatism of the common law can work its way through the problems
presented by cyber targeting.

(4th Cir. 1997). The Barrett court, on the other hand, speculated that there would not be
such a flood of litigation and also concluded that existing protections both constitutional
and otherwise would stave off a large number of potential defamation plaintiffs. Barrett
v. Rosenthal, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). If the Internet industry
continues to thrive in Britain, it may undermine one of the important assumptions of
Zeran that supports the broad interpretation of immunity in both that case and its
progeny.

